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On November 29, 2004, the Third Circuit in Forum for Academic and 
Institutional Rights (“FAIR”) v. Rumsfeld1 held that the Solomon 
Amendment, a federal law requiring law schools to permit military 
recruiters on campus to recruit,2 was unconstitutional.3  The decision 
 1. 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004) [hereinafter FAIR II] (holding that the enforcement of 
the Solomon Act against law schools violates their First Amendment rights under the 
doctrines of expressive association and compelled speech). 
 2. See 10 U.S.C.S. § 983(b) (2004) (conditioning the receipt of federal funding, which 
is vital to the functioning of academic institutions, on the offering of the military equal 
access to campus recruiting). 
 3. See FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 246 (holding that the Solomon Amendment burdened the 
law schools’ right to free speech because it required the schools to express a message that 
was incompatible with their nondiscrimination policies).  The court also reasoned that there 
was no compelling government interest justifying the denial of free speech.  Id. 
1
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marked a victory for law schools nationwide, who may soon be able to 
enforce their existing nondiscrimination policies against military recruiters 
without the risk of losing federal funding.4
I.  BACKGROUND 
For decades, law schools have had policies preventing employers who 
discriminate against certain classes of individuals from recruiting on their 
campuses.5  In the 1970s, law schools began expanding their recruitment 
policies to include a prohibition against sexual orientation discrimination.6  
In 1990, recognizing the prevalence of these policies in its member schools, 
the Association of American Law Schools (“AALS”) voted to require all 
member schools to exclude employers who discriminate on grounds of 
sexual orientation from campus recruiting activities.7  The AALS has 
enforced this policy by requiring employers who recruit at law schools to 
provide written assurance that they do not discriminate, inter alia, against 
gays or lesbians.8  Because the military effectively banned homosexual 
service members from its ranks for the better part of the century, law 
schools began enforcing their nondiscrimination policies by preventing the 
military from recruiting on campus.9
 4. See Heller Ehrman White & McAuliffe LLP, Frequently Asked Questions About the 
Third Circuit’s Decision in the Solomon Amendment Case (FAIR v. Rumsfeld) [hereinafter 
Frequently Asked Questions] (opining that the scope of the injunction on the Solomon 
Amendment might well be national because the remedy would have to cover each plaintiff 
in the litigation and there are plaintiffs from all over the country involved in the case), 
available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/ solomon/documents/FAIRvRumsfeldQA.pdf 
(last visited June 6, 2005).  Note that the law firm of Heller Ehrman argued FAIR v. 
Rumsfeld before the Third Circuit.  FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 219. 
 5. See, e.g., ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCH. (“AALS”), BYLAWS § 6-3(b) (2004) (prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of, inter alia, race, sex, national origin, and disability), available 
at http://www.aals.org/bylaws.html (last visited June 6, 2005); see also FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 
224 (explaining how law schools have long required equal opportunity in the job 
recruitment process). 
 6. See FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 224-25 (describing how some law schools, as early as 
1970, began requiring that on-campus recruiters not discriminate based on sexual 
orientation). 
 7. See AALS, EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE REGULATIONS § 6-3.2(a) (2004) (mandating that 
member law schools have employers certify to the school’s nondiscrimination policy as a 
condition of obtaining Career Services assistance), available at http://www.aals.org/ecr (last 
visited June 6, 2005); see also Marcia Coyle, Law Schools v. Defense Department: Bush to 
Appeal over Military Recruiting, NAT’L LAW J., Jan. 31, 2005, at 1 (explaining how the 
AALS made it a requirement of membership in the association that law schools ban 
employers who discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation). 
 8. See The AALS Commitment to Nondiscrimination and the AALS’ Amelioration 
Requirement ¶2 (describing how the AALS enacted this measure in their regulations to 
enforce their nondiscrimination policies), at http://www.law. 
georgetown.edu/solomon/Commitment.html (last visited June 6, 2005). 
 9. See id. (summarizing the military’s history of discrimination against homosexuals); 
see also Michelle Lore, Minnesota Law Schools Review Ruling on On-campus Military 
Recruiting, MINN. LAW., Dec. 20, 2004 (noting that after the AALS enacted the 1990 policy, 
law schools nationwide began banning on-campus military recruiting) (on file with the 
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law). 
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In 1993, Congress passed the Don’t Ask–Don’t Tell–Don’t Pursue 
Policy (“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”).10  Under this statute, the military may 
discharge any service member who “engage[s] in . . . a homosexual act” or 
“state[s] that he or she is a homosexual.”11  Because Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell 
bans openly gay service members, the military has been unable to comply 
with AALS’s nondiscrimination policy.12  The effect of this tension 
between AALS and military policy has been national resistance against 
military recruitment in law schools.13
To respond to this resistance, Representative Solomon introduced a bill 
that conditioned the receipt of Department of Defense (“DOD”) funds by 
educational institutions on the inclusion of the military in campus 
recruitment activities.14  In 1995, Congress enacted the “Solomon 
Amendment.”15  Over the years, Congress has amended the Solomon 
Amendment a number of times in response to law schools prohibiting 
military recruitment on their campuses.16  Under the most current revision, 
law schools risk losing extensive federal funding if they do not allow the 
military to recruit on campus “in a manner that is at least equal in quality 
and scope” as is provided to “any other employer.”17
Initially, the DOD lackadaisically enforced the Solomon Amendment, 
 10. See 10 U.S.C.S. § 654 (1993) (providing for the separation of a service member 
from the military if he or she engages in homosexual acts or proclaims him or herself to be a 
homosexual); Howard J. Bashman, Striking Down the Solomon Amendment on Military 
Recruiting: A Hollow Victory at the Expense of Our Military, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., 
Jan. 7, 2004, at 14 (noting that President Clinton signed “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” into law in 
1993, allowing the military to continue to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation). 
 11. 10 U.S.C.S. § 654(b). 
 12. See, e.g., Burt v. Rumsfeld, 354 F. Supp. 2d 156, 168 (D. Conn. 2005) (mentioning 
that the Department of Defense has refused to certify its compliance with Yale Law 
School’s nondiscrimination policy because of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”). 
 13. See FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 225-26 (noting how law schools’ resistance to military 
recruiting after “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” sparked the creation of the Solomon Amendment). 
 14. See 140 CONG. REC. H3861-63 (daily ed. May 23, 1994) (statement of Sen. 
Solomon) (urging his colleagues to “send a message over the wall of the ivory tower of 
higher education” that if schools are too self-righteous to treat the military with respect, then 
they can do without the benefits of federal funding). 
 15. See 10 U.S.C.S. § 654; FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 226 (noting that, despite some initial 
resistance on Capitol Hill, the House passed the Solomon Amendment by a vote of 271 to 
126).  The Senate approved the bill several months later.  Id.  
 16. Compare Pub. L. No. 92-436, § 606, 86 Stat. 734 (1972) (denying DOD funding to 
institutions that blocked military recruiters), with Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 514(b), 110 Stat. 
3009-270 (1996) (expanding the penalty to include funds from the Departments of 
Transportation, Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education), and Pub. L. No. 106-
65, § 549(a)(1) (1999) (extending the scope of the Solomon Amendment to any 
“subelements” of academic institutions), and Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 552, 118 Stat. 1811 
(2004) (requiring not only military access to campus recruiting, but access “in a manner that 
is at least equal in quality and scope” to that provided to other employers).  But see Pub. L. 
No. 106-79, 113 Stat. 1212 (1999) (revising the Solomon Amendment so the penalty for 
noncompliance does not affect funds “available solely for student financial assistance or 
related administrative costs”). 
 17. See 10 U.S.C.S. § 983(b). 
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but it began to demand strict compliance after the September 11, 2001, 
terrorist attacks.18  Law schools that had policies allowing the military on 
campus, but in a limited capacity, began feeling DOD pressure to conform 
to the statute by providing equal access to military recruiters.19  By 2003, 
most law schools had adopted policies exempting the military from their 
law schools’ nondiscrimination policies.20
Currently, the AALS policy excuses member law schools from the 
enforcement of the nondiscrimination policy against the military, provided 
that the school takes ameliorative steps to mitigate the message being sent 
to students by allowing the military on campus.21  In most schools, these 
ameliorative steps consist of protests on the day or days the military is 
present on campus.22
The Solomon Amendment forces law schools to choose between 
receiving federal funding and protecting gay or lesbian students from 
discrimination.23  The Amendment compels schools to send a message that 
their educational institutions condone such discrimination, despite their 
 18. See FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 227 (noting that following the 2001 terrorist attacks, the 
DOD began demanding compliance with the Solomon Act); see also Coyle, supra note 7, at 
1 (reporting that the “changed environment” of post-September 11 caused the DOD to step 
up enforcement of the Solomon Amendment, which sparked the recent lawsuits including 
FAIR v. Rumsfeld). 
 19. See FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 227 (noting that prior to the fall of 2001, the DOD did not 
seem to consider restricted military access to campus recruiting to be a violation of the 
Solomon Amendment); see also Burt, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 168-69 (summarizing how Yale, 
which required the military to recruit off campus, did not have problems with the DOD until 
after the fall of 2001). 
 20. See FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 228 (explaining that because of “the millions of dollars at 
stake, every law school that receives federal funds had, by the 2003 recruiting season, 
suspended its nondiscrimination policy as applied to military recruiters.”). 
 21. See Memorandum from Carl Monk, to the Deans of Member and Fee-Paid Schools 
(Jan. 24, 2000) (mentioning that member law schools that allow the military on campus 
should dissociate themselves from the military’s discrimination and take steps to remedy 
any adverse effects of non-compliance with the AALS nondiscrimination policy), at 
http://www.aals.org/00-2.html (last visited June 6, 2005). 
 22. See Memorandum from AALS Deputy Director Bari Burke, to the Deans of 
Member and Fee-Paid Law Schools (May 14, 1998) (asking schools to publicly express 
their disapproval of discrimination against the military’s position of discrimination based on 
sexual orientation), at http://www.aals.org/98-23.html (last visited June 6, 2005); see also 
Stacy J. Evans, Military Recruitment and a Few Good Ameliorative Measures, NALP 
BULLETIN 1-2 (2003) (listing ways law schools can ameliorate the negative effects of 
allowing the military to recruit on campus, including: 1) a letter from the dean to the 
students explaining the school’s position on discrimination against homosexuals; 2) the 
creation of a faculty resolution to treat all students equally regardless of sexual orientation; 
3) holding a protest against the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy; and 4) having a 
diversity day to show campus solidarity), available at 
http://www.nalp.org/assets/library/140_0903mil.pdf (last visited June 6, 2005). 
 23. See Patrick Fitzgerald, Law School Antidiscrimination Policy Upheld by Court, 
STANFORD DAILY, Feb. 15, 2005 (noting that most law schools are torn between honoring 
their nondiscrimination policies and receiving federal funding), available at 
http://www.stanforddaily.com/tempo?page=content&id=16134&repository=0001_article 
(last visited July 17, 2005). 
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nondiscrimination policies.24  On September 19, 2003, an association of 
law schools and law faculty (FAIR) sued the DOD, seeking an injunction 
on the enforcement of the Solomon Amendment.25
II.  DISTRICT COURT 
Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction against the Solomon 
Amendment, arguing that the Solomon Amendment was unconstitutional.26  
The plaintiffs’ first argument was that the Solomon Amendment 
unconstitutionally conditioned federal funding on the surrendering of First 
Amendment rights.27  Second, the plaintiffs argued that the Solomon 
Amendment discriminated on the basis of viewpoint by only promoting a 
pro-military recruiting message and punishing those schools that chose to 
exclude the military because they found the military’s message to be 
repugnant.28  The plaintiffs last argued that the Solomon Amendment was 
unconstitutionally vague.29  The United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey summarily rejected all three arguments and denied 
plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction.30  Central to the court’s 
holding was that the act of recruiting was not itself a form of speech; if 
anything, it was expressive conduct, demanding a lower level of scrutiny 
 24. See FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269, 281-82 (D. N.J. 2003) [hereinafter 
FAIR I] (explaining that law schools “are loathe” to engage in recruitment activities that 
would suggest that the military’s discrimination against homosexuals is acceptable). 
 25. See id. at 275-76. 
 26. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction at 19, FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004) (No. 03-4433) [hereinafter 
Plaintiffs’ Brief]. 
 27. See id. at 19-31 (explaining how the Solomon Amendment unconstitutionally 
conditions receipt of federal funding on the law schools’ relinquishment of the First 
Amendment rights of academic freedom, expressive association, and freedom from 
compelled speech).  But cf. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to 
Dismiss and Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 22, FAIR v. 
Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004) (No. 03-4433) [hereinafter Defendants’ Brief] 
(arguing that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is inapplicable in the present case 
because the Solomon Amendment does not restrict speech).  Law schools, the defendants 
point out, are “free to speak as they please.”  Defendants’ Brief, supra, at 24. 
 28. See Plaintiffs’ Brief, supra note 26, at 31-32 (contending that the Solomon 
Amendment should be struck down because it unconstitutionally promotes the military’s 
viewpoint and punishes law schools that attempt to ban military recruiting to avoid that 
viewpoint).  But cf. Defendants’ Brief, supra note 27, at 29-31 (suggesting that it is 
impossible for the Solomon Amendment to discriminate on the basis of viewpoint because 
the law does not even target speech). 
 29. See Plaintiffs’ Brief, supra note 26, at 33-36 (arguing that the Solomon 
Amendment, as well as the DOD’s interpretations of it, is unconstitutionally vague, because 
there are no clear guidelines for compliance and it has the potential to be arbitrarily applied 
in a discriminatory manner).  But cf. Defendants’ Brief, supra note 27, at 31-34 (explaining 
that the terms of the Solomon Amendment are clear: if a school denies the military equal 
access to on-campus recruiting, it loses federal funding). 
 30. See FAIR I, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 275 (denying the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary 
injunction because the district court found plaintiffs failed to establish a likelihood of 
success on the merits of their constitutional claims). 
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under the First Amendment.31
A.  Unconstitutional Conditions Claim 
The court first considered whether the Solomon Amendment 
unconstitutionally conditioned federal funds on the relinquishment of First 
Amendment rights.32  The court began its analysis by noting that the 
Spending Clause granted Congress the authority to enact the Solomon 
Amendment.33  Congress, the court stressed, has wide latitude under the 
Spending Clause to condition the receipt of funding in furtherance of 
important policy objectives.34  However in some instances, the court noted, 
the First Amendment trumps the Spending Clause.35  In these instances, 
courts apply the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.36
Under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, the state may not deny 
a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes on that person’s 
constitutionally protected interests.37  Thus, for the doctrine to apply, the 
plaintiffs had to identify a constitutionally protected interest that was being 
infringed upon.38  The plaintiffs argued that their constitutionally-protected 
interests of academic freedom and First Amendment rights under the 
expressive association and compelled speech doctrines were being 
unconstitutionally conditioned by the Solomon Amendment.39
 31. See id. at 310-14 (deciding that because the Solomon Amendment only indirectly 
infringes on speech, intermediate scrutiny, not strict scrutiny, should be applied to analyze 
whether the Solomon Amendment is constitutional). 
 32. See id. at 299-301 (laying the framework for discussion of the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine).  The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions prohibits the state from 
denying a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes on a constitutionally protected 
interest.  Id. at 299. 
 33. See id. at 298 (noting that “the Spending Clause is the appropriate starting point for 
assessing the constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment”). 
 34. See id. at 298-99; United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 203 
(2003) (explaining that the Spending Clause allows Congress to attach conditions to the 
receipt of federal funds and the Supreme Court has emphasized that “Congress has wide 
latitude to attach conditions to the receipt of federal assistance to further its policy 
objectives”). 
 35. See FAIR I, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 299 (warning that congressional spending power is 
not unlimited).  Other constitutional provisions in some instances trump congressional 
spending power.  Id. 
 36. See id. (noting that “[t]raditional Spending Clause analysis does not apply in 
situations where the spending power clashes with First Amendment rights.”).  In those 
cases, it is proper to apply the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to consider whether the 
condition of federal funding unconstitutionally infringes on First Amendment freedoms.  Id. 
 37. See Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (explaining that the state cannot 
constitutionally compel an individual to relinquish his or her constitutionally protected 
rights by providing or denying an incentive for giving up  rights). 
 38. See FAIR I, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 301 (stating that “[a] finding of an unconstitutional 
condition presupposes that there is a relinquishment of a constitutional right.”). 
 39. See Plaintiffs’ Brief, supra note 26, at 19-31 (arguing how compliance with the 
Solomon Amendment forced law schools to relinquish their academic freedom and First 
Amendment rights under the expressive association and compelled speech doctrines).  But 
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The court decided that academic freedom, while important, could not 
stand alone as a constitutionally protected interest.40  The court agreed that 
the plaintiffs qualified as expressive associations, but held that law schools 
were not forced to contradict their nondiscrimination policies because at no 
point during campus recruiting does the military ever become a member of 
a law school.41  Nor does the military ever have the authority to speak on 
the school’s behalf.42  The court also found it persuasive that the plaintiffs 
were able to engage in ameliorative measures, such as Judge Advocate 
General (“JAG”) protests, which could counteract any harmful effect 
created through military recruitment.43  Finally, the court rejected the 
notion that the plaintiffs had a constitutionally protected interest under the 
compelled speech doctrine because the court saw recruiting as an economic 
activity.44
The court balanced the interests involved to determine whether the 
Solomon Amendment violated the First Amendment.45  Because the court 
perceived recruitment as a mixture of speech and non-speech, it applied 
intermediate scrutiny to the Solomon Amendment.46  The court found that 
cf. Defendants’ Brief, supra note 27, at 22 (asserting that the Solomon Amendment cannot 
violate the unconstitutional conditions doctrine because the statute is unrelated to speech). 
 40. See FAIR I, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 303 (deciding for the purposes of the case at bar that 
“the right to academic freedom is not cognizable without a foundational free speech or 
associational right.”).  The court also explained that if the Solomon Amendment 
unconstitutionally conditions the law schools’ academic freedom, it is only because it also 
infringes on the law schools’ free speech or associational rights.  Id. 
 41. See id. at 304 (finding that law schools have official policies pertaining to sexual 
orientation issues, which is enough to make them expressive associations for the purpose of 
the First Amendment).  The court continued its analysis of the expressive association 
doctrine and decided that it is inapplicable to the case at bar because law schools are not 
forced to speak or restricted from speaking when the military is on campus.  Id. at 306. 
 42. See id. at 305 (deciding that requiring law schools to permit the military to recruit 
on campus does not force law schools to send a message that is antagonistic to law schools’ 
nondiscrimination policies because at no point can it be said that the military recruiters have 
the authority to speak on the law schools’ behalf).  The court further pointed out that law 
schools are able at any point to proclaim their own message condemning the military’s 
employment discrimination, as many schools do through campus-wide protests and other 
“ameliorative measures.”  Id. at 305-06. 
 43. See id. (stating that “[w]hile there is tension between the Solomon Amendment and 
law school recruiting policies, there are ways of relieving that tension by taking ameliorative 
measures to distance the law schools from the military’s discriminatory policy.”). 
 44. See id. at 307-08 (distinguishing the case at bar from cases involving the solicitation 
of contributions and proselytizing, because recruiting is essentially an economic activity, 
where soliciting contributions and proselytizing implicate free speech interests, including 
communication of information and dissemination and propagation of views and ideas). 
 45. See id. at 310 (noting that the final step in the expressive association analysis 
involved “balancing the First Amendment interests implicated by the Solomon Amendment 
with competing societal interests to determine whether the statute transgresses constitutional 
boundaries.”). 
 46. See id. at 311 (applying intermediate scrutiny because the Solomon Amendment 
affects associational rights in an indirect and less immediate fashion).  The court found that 
heightened, or strict scrutiny, is only appropriate where state action directly burdened 
expressive rights.  Id. at 310.  But see Plaintiffs’ Brief, supra note 26, at 28 (arguing that the 
Solomon Amendment does directly burden law schools’ First Amendment rights, so the 
7
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the Solomon Amendment did not violate the plaintiffs’ rights under the 
unconstitutional condition doctrine because: 1) it was authorized by 
Congress; 2) it furthered a substantial state interest; 3) it did not target 
speech; and 4) any incidental restriction on speech was no more than was 
necessary to meet the state interest.47
B.  Viewpoint Discrimination 
The court next considered whether the Solomon Amendment was 
unconstitutional as invidious viewpoint discrimination.48  The court noted 
that the government may not regulate speech based on the message it 
conveys, but refused to deem the Solomon Amendment a governmental 
restriction on speech.49  The plaintiffs argued that the Solomon 
Amendment discriminated on the basis of viewpoint by promoting a pro-
military message and by punishing law schools that chose to exclude the 
military.50  The court rejected both of these arguments.  The court 
distinguished the present case from a situation in which the state effectively 
drives a viewpoint from discourse.51  Law schools that are in compliance 
with the Solomon Amendment, the court noted, are still able to express 
their anti-discrimination message through ameliorative measures, such as 
JAG protests.52  Additionally, the court stressed that the Solomon 
Amendment’s impact on speech was incidental and thus the plaintiffs’ use 
proper standard to apply to the statute to weigh its constitutionality is strict scrutiny). 
 47. See FAIR I, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 312-14 (applying intermediate scrutiny to the case at 
bar and finding the Solomon Amendment’s incidental burdening of the law schools’ 
expression constitutional). 
 48. See id. at 314-15 (analyzing whether the plaintiffs were correct in claiming that the 
Solomon Amendment discriminates on the basis of viewpoint by promoting only a pro-
military message and by punishing those schools that ban military recruiting because they 
disagree with the message). 
 49. See id. (finding that while the state may not regulate speech based on its content, the 
Solomon Amendment’s incidental restriction on speech is not a situation where there is a 
risk of “excising specific ideas or viewpoints from the public discourse”). 
 50. See Plaintiffs’ Brief, supra note 26, at 226 (arguing that the legislative history 
indicates that the Solomon Amendment was passed to “‘send a message over the wall of the 
ivory tower of higher education,’” which clearly indicates that the law discriminates on the 
basis of viewpoint by promoting a pro-military message at the expense of law schools’ First 
Amendment freedoms) (internal citations omitted); see also 140 CONG. REC. 11,441 (1994) 
(Rep. Pombo) (stating that higher education needs to know that their “starry-eyed idealism” 
comes with a price and urging his colleagues to support the Solomon Amendment). 
 51. See FAIR I, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 314-16 (noting that while the Solomon Amendment 
had the effect of restricting expression, that restriction was incidental to the statute’s 
primary purpose and thus it could not be said that the Solomon Amendment preferred one 
viewpoint to another).  The law schools’ viewpoint is still quite present in the public 
discourse through the use of ameliorative measures.  Id. at 315. 
 52. See id. (arguing that if the Solomon Amendment really did promote a pro-military 
message at the expense of the law schools’ anti-discrimination message, then law schools 
that engaged in ameliorative measures would be unable to do so and still be in compliance 
with the statute).  The fact that law schools are able to engage in protest without any 
statutory consequences proved to the court that the Solomon Amendment could not be 
discriminating on the basis of viewpoint.  Id. 
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of the viewpoint discrimination doctrine was unavailing.53
C.  Void-for-Vagueness 
Finally, the court considered the plaintiffs’ third argument, that the 
Solomon Amendment was unconstitutionally vague, leaving too much 
discretion in the hands of the DOD.54  Under the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine, a law cannot be so vague that an individual of “common 
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.”55  Additionally, under 
the doctrine, the law must provide specific standards for those who apply it 
to avoid arbitrary enforcement.56  The court noted that laws that burden 
First Amendment rights must regulate with narrow specificity.57  The court, 
however, applied a lower vagueness standard in reviewing the Solomon 
Amendment because the Solomon Amendment did not directly burden 
speech.58  The court found the Solomon Amendment was not 
unconstitutionally vague because the statute and regulations were clear as 
to what conduct triggered the withholding of federal funds and on the 
penalty for noncompliance.59
D.  Holding 
The district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary 
injunction, and found the Solomon Amendment constitutional under the 
doctrines of unconstitutional condition, viewpoint discrimination, and void-
for-vagueness.60
 53. See id. at 316-17 (finding that because the Solomon Amendment’s burden on 
speech is incidental, “any threat of government compulsion to adopt a particular viewpoint 
is far too tenuous and insubstantial to trigger constitutional alarm.”). 
 54. See id. at 317-21. 
 55. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). 
 56. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (explaining that laws 
can be vague by failing to provide explicit standards for those who apply them).  The 
Grayned Court noted that the requirement of specific standards helps to avoid arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement of a law.  Id. 
 57. See FAIR I, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 317 (noting that the vagueness analysis is different 
in the context of the First Amendment).  “Because First Amendment freedoms need 
breathing space to survive,” courts tend to require that the state be very clear with its 
legislation and “regulate only with narrow specificity.”  Id. at 317-18 (internal citations 
omitted); see also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (holding that because First 
Amendment freedoms are delicate and are so cherished by our society, the government may 
only regulate with narrow specificity when First Amendment freedoms are burdened by the 
application of a law). 
 58. See FAIR I, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 318. 
 59. See id. at 318-21 (indicating that the statute is clear on the penalty for 
noncompliance and discussing what conduct could trigger the penalty). 
 60. See id. at 296-322 (holding that the enforcement of the Solomon Amendment 
against law schools is constitutional because recruitment is not a form of expression, and the 
statute’s infringement on speech is incidental and unsubstantial).  The court held that the 
law is clear as to its terms for compliance and penalties for noncompliance.  Id. 
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III.  THIRD CIRCUIT 
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and 
remanded the case, directing the lower court to issue the preliminary 
injunction enjoining the enforcement of the Solomon Amendment.61  The 
court found the enforcement of the Solomon Amendment against the law 
schools to be an unconstitutional condition.62  The plaintiffs argued, and 
the court found, two constitutional theories that supported a finding of an 
unconstitutional condition, expressive association and compelled speech.63  
The Third Circuit held that the plaintiffs would likely prevail under either 
theory.64  Notably, unlike the district court, the circuit court saw the act of 
recruiting as expression, requiring a strict scrutiny analysis under the First 
Amendment. 
A.  Expressive Association 
The Third Circuit first addressed the plaintiffs’ claim of expressive 
association to determine if they satisfied the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine.65  There are three elements a court must consider in an expressive 
association claim: “(1) whether a group is an ‘expressive association,’ (2) 
whether the state action at issue significantly affects the group’s ability to 
advocate its viewpoint, and (3) whether the state’s interest justifies the 
burden it imposes on the group’s expressive association.”66  In analyzing 
this claim, the court focused heavily on the Supreme Court’s analysis in 
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,67 a case where the Supreme Court held that 
the Boy Scouts (“BSA”), as an expressive association, could not be forced 
 61. See FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 246 (finding that “the Solomon Amendment cannot 
condition federal funding on law schools’ compliance” because that condition infringes 
upon the plaintiffs’ constitutionally protected interests under the expressive association and 
compelled speech doctrines).  Note that this case was decided 2-1 on a panel of three judges.  
See id. at 246-47 (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (dissenting because the majority did not presume 
that the Solomon Amendment was constitutional, and because the dissent did not believe 
that there was a connection between permitting the military on campus and requiring law 
schools to breach their nondiscrimination policies). 
 62. See id. at 229 (agreeing with the district court that the Supreme Court’s exception to 
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine for selective spending programs does not apply to 
the case at bar, because the Solomon Amendment does not create a spending program).  But 
see id. at 248 (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for not applying a 
presumption of constitutionality to the Solomon Amendment). 
 63. See FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 230.  But see id. (noting that the plaintiffs’ third proposed 
theory of vagueness, which they had argued at the district court level, has been mooted on 
appeal by the 2004 Amendment of the Solomon law). 
 64. See id. at 235, 242-43. 
 65. See id. at 235 (holding that the plaintiffs have a constitutionally protected interest 
under the expressive association doctrine and thus are likely able to prove the merits of their 
unconstitutional conditions claim). 
 66. Id. at 231 (citing Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648-49 (2000)). 
 67. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 648 (recognizing an expressive association’s right to exclude 
an unwanted person who could significantly affect that group’s ability to advocate its 
viewpoint). 
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to accept an openly gay man as assistant scout master because doing so 
would force the organization to express a message that was contrary to 
their long-held belief that homosexuality is an illegitimate lifestyle.68
The Third Circuit first considered whether the plaintiffs constituted 
expressive associations.  An “expressive association” is a group that 
engages in some form of public or private expression above a de minimus 
level.69  The court noted that law schools are highly expressive 
organizations because they have philosophies and values that are ingrained 
in their students as part of the students’ education.70  Consequently, the 
court found the first element of the expressive association doctrine 
satisfied. 
The court next considered whether the enforcement of the Solomon 
Amendment significantly affected the plaintiffs’ ability to advocate their 
viewpoint.  The court analogized Dale to FAIR and concluded that the law 
schools’ ability to advocate their viewpoint was significantly affected by 
the enforcement of the Solomon Amendment.71  In Dale, the Court noted 
that the BSA felt that homosexuality was inconsistent with their Scout 
Oath.72  The FAIR court similarly found that the law schools believed that 
employment discrimination was inconsistent with their commitments to 
justice.73  In Dale, the Court felt that homosexuals were not role models 
consistent with the expectations of scouting families.74  Similar to the 
reasoning of Dale, the FAIR court found that law schools felt that the 
exclusionary practices of the military did not provide a model consistent 
with expectations of the legal community at large.75  The Third Circuit also 
 68. See FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 231-32 (analogizing the BSA’s right to exclude gays 
because gay conduct is antagonistic to the BSA’s viewpoint, with the law schools’ right to 
exclude the military because the military’s employment discrimination is antagonistic to the 
schools’ viewpoint).   But see id. at 260 (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Dale logic 
cannot be applied to FAIR, because unlike requiring BSA to take on a gay man as an 
assistant scout master, the Solomon Amendment does not require law schools to take on the 
military in any membership capacity). 
 69. See Pi Lambda Phi, Inc. v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 229 F.3d 435, 443-44 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(defining the term of art, “expressive association”). 
 70. See FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 231 (finding that the plaintiffs are expressive associations 
because they have demonstrated “that the law schools possess clear educational 
philosophies, missions and goals”) (internal citation omitted). 
 71. See id. at 233 (deciding to give the same deference to the law schools’ opinion as to 
what affects the dissemination of their message that was given to the Boy Scouts in Dale). 
 72. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 652 (noting the BSA believes that homosexual conduct does 
not conform to the “morally straight” standard of the Scout Oath). 
 73. See FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 232 (highlighting how both the BSA in Dale and the law 
schools in FAIR were similarly forced to adopt a message that was inconsistent with their 
values). 
 74. See Dale, 530 F.3d at 652 (stressing that the BSA does not “allow for the 
registration of avowed homosexuals as members or as leaders”). 
 75. See FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 232 (noting that the BSA in Dale and the law schools in 
FAIR both desired to set an example to their members and saw the inclusion of an 
inconsistent message as antagonistic to that goal). 
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noted that the Dale court gave great deference to the Boy Scouts’ view of 
acts which would impair its expression, recognizing that the association 
itself is best situated to ascertain how state action impairs its message.76  
The Third Circuit gave similar discretion to the plaintiffs in the present 
case, finding that the plaintiffs met the second element of the expressive 
association doctrine.77
Finally, the court considered whether the state’s interest justified the 
burden it imposed on the plaintiffs.78  The court began by presuming that 
the state has a compelling interest in attracting military lawyers.79  
However, the court noted that the state action must also be narrowly 
tailored to achieve the compelling interest.80  Here, the military had other 
means of attracting military lawyers.81  For example, the military has 
access to considerable funding and may attract recruits through 
sophisticated programs that are generally unavailable to other employers, 
such as television commercials, public advertisements, and loan repayment 
programs.82  The court also noted that the government failed to provide any 
evidence that the Solomon Amendment materially enhanced its goal of 
attracting military lawyers.83  In fact, the court suggested that the Solomon 
Amendment may detrimentally affect the military’s efforts to recruit 
lawyers, because it has generated much ill-will in academia.84  The court 
decided that while the state’s interests are compelling, its chosen means are 
not narrowly tailored to meet those interests.85  Thus, the court found that 
 76. See id. at 233 (noting the Dale Court’s instruction to deter an organization’s opinion 
as to what compromises the expression of its viewpoint when considering the second 
element of the expressive association doctrine) (quoting Dale, 530 U.S. at 653). 
 77. See FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 233 (taking note of the fact that “FAIR has supplied 
written evidence of its belief that the Solomon Amendment’s forcible inclusion of and 
assistance to military recruiters undermines their efforts to disseminate their chosen message 
of nondiscrimination.  Accordingly, we must give Dale deference to this belief . . . .”). 
 78. See id. at 234 (finding that while the state interest is compelling, the Solomon 
Amendment still violates the First Amendment because it is not narrowly tailored). 
 79. See id. 
 80. See id. (explaining that under strict scrutiny a compelling interest alone is not 
enough; the state must also demonstrate that the law or policy in question is “narrowly 
tailored”). 
 81. See id. at 235 (explaining that the state “has given [the court] no reason to suspect 
that [other means of attracting military lawyers] are less effective than on-campus 
recruiting.”). 
 82. See id. (exploring alternative methods for attracting military lawyers). 
 83. See id. (implying that if the DOD had provided proof that the Solomon Amendment 
is necessary to attract military lawyers, the court might have found the Solomon 
Amendment constitutional). 
 84. See id. (finding nothing in the record to prove that the Solomon Amendment 
“materially enhances its stated goal” and musing that “it may plausibly be the case that the 
Solomon Amendment . . . actually impedes recruitment”) (emphasis in original). 
 85. See id. (stating that “[the] availability of alternative, less speech-restrictive means of 
effective recruitment is sufficient to render the Solomon Amendment unconstitutional under 
strict scrutiny analysis.”). 
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the third and final element of the expressive association doctrine was met,  
holding that the plaintiffs would likely prevail on their expressive 
association claim.86
B.  Compelled Speech 
The court then turned to the plaintiffs’ second theory of 
unconstitutionality: compelled speech.  The court noted that there are three 
general categories of compelled speech, propagation, accommodation, and 
subsidizing.87  First, the court found that the act of recruiting was 
expression.  It then determined that law schools disagreed with the speech 
of military recruiting.  The court then found that law schools must 
propagate, accommodate, and subsidize the military’s expressive message.  
Finally, the court found that requiring the law schools to propagate, 
accommodate and subsidize these messages failed strict scrutiny.   
The court began by finding that the act of recruiting was a form of 
expression,88 noting that the purpose of recruiting is to attract employees.89  
This purpose necessarily requires the communication of information, 
dissemination of ideas, and other hallmarks of First Amendment 
expression.90
The court next addressed whether the law schools disagreed with the 
military recruiters.91  The court noted that the law schools’ did not take 
issue with most military positions;92 rather, schools opposed solely the 
 86. But see id. at 260 (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority’s 
application of the expressive association doctrine because recruiting is not expression in the 
nude; it is “an economic activity whose expressive content is strictly secondary to its 
instrumental goals.”). 
 87. See id. at 235-36 (noting that the Supreme Court has recognized “impermissible 
compelled speech in three categories of government action”); see, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of 
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (propagation); Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, 
Lesbian, & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 581 (1995) (accommodation); United 
States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 413 (2001) (subsidizing). 
 88. See id. at 237 (explaining that recruiting is a form of expression because, inter alia, 
it “conveys the message that ‘our organization is worth working for’”); see also Village of 
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980) (pointing out that 
recruiting involves “communication of information, the dissemination and propagation of 
views and ideas, and the advocacy of causes[,]” which are hallmarks of First Amendment 
expression). 
 89. See FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 237 (explaining that the communication that is required to 
attract employees is going to require expression, whether the purpose of the act is economic 
and functional in nature or not). 
 90. See id. (deciding that recruiting is a form of expression under the First 
Amendment).  But see id. at 256 (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (arguing that recruitment is really 
better characterized as expressive conduct, not bare-boned expression). 
 91. See id. at 237-40 (exploring the extent to which a viewpoint must be inconsistent 
with another to warrant protection under the compelled speech doctrine).  The court here 
found that the law schools’ viewpoint was inconsistent enough with the military’s viewpoint 
to warrant protection under the compelled speech doctrine.  Id. 
 92. See id. at 237 (noting that the law schools do not seem to disagree with the value, 
opinion and endorsement of the military to the extent that they show the honor and reward 
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military’s position on employment of homosexuals.93  Finding that the 
degree of disagreement required to trigger First Amendment scrutiny is 
minimal at best, the court held that the law schools met the degree 
necessary by squarely opposing the military’s position on the employment 
of homosexuals as codified by Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.94
Next, the court turned to the question of whether law schools must 
propagate, accommodate and subsidize the military’s expressive message.  
The court found that under the current version of the Solomon Amendment, 
law schools not only had to grant access to the military, they also had to 
actively participate in the communication of the military’s message.95  By 
requiring law schools to distribute newsletters and post notices about 
military recruitment, the Solomon Amendment forced law schools to 
disseminate the military’s message.96  By requiring law schools to invite 
the military on campus to recruit, the Solomon Amendment forced law 
schools to accommodate the military’s message.97  Finally, by requiring 
law schools to use their campus recruiting resources to assist the military in 
recruitment, the Solomon Amendment forced law schools to subsidize the 
military’s message.98  Consequently, the court found all three types of 
compelled speech applicable to the current case. 
Finally, the court considered whether under a strict scrutiny analysis, the 
compelled speech in the present case was unconstitutional.99  The court 
found that the compelled speech failed strict scrutiny because although 
there was a compelling state interest in attracting military lawyers, the 
means were not narrowly tailored to the ends.100  Thus, the court found that 
the plaintiffs likely met the compelled speech doctrine and would likely 
prevail on their unconstitutional condition claim.101
of military experiences). 
 93. See id. at 238-39 (deciding that the law schools’ viewpoint juxtaposed with the 
military’s de jure discrimination under Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell is plainly inconsistent enough 
to trigger First Amendment protection under the compelled speech doctrine). 
 94. See id. at 239 (holding that the military’s policy against homosexual service 
members is sufficiently in conflict with the law schools’ anti-discrimination policies). 
 95. See id. at 240 (pointing out that “[t]he statute insists not only on access to campus 
for military recruiters, but the active and equal assistance of law schools’ career service 
offices.”). 
 96. See id. (finding that such distribution compels law schools to propagate the 
military’s discriminatory viewpoint). 
 97. See id. (finding that by requiring law schools to include the military in interviews 
and recruiting receptions, the Solomon Amendment is forcing law schools to accommodate 
the military’s viewpoint). 
 98. See id. 
 99. See id. at 242 (noting that a law that compels speech might still be constitutional if 
it passes strict scrutiny). 
 100. See id. (presuming that there are less restrictive means for the state to use to achieve 
their goal of military recruitment of lawyers). 
 101. See id. at 243. 
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C.  Holding 
The Third Circuit reversed the district court’s decision.  The court held 
that the plaintiffs would likely prevail on the merits of their 
unconstitutional conditions claim, because their First Amendment rights 
were being violated by the Solomon Amendment under the expressive 
association and compelled speech doctrines.102  The court found that by 
establishing a likelihood of success on the merits of a First Amendment 
claim, which is the first element of the standard for preliminary injunction, 
the plaintiffs necessarily established the second preliminary injunction 
element of irreparable harm.103  Because the plaintiffs’ First Amendment 
rights would be impaired every campus recruitment season and because the 
DOD would have another opportunity to meet their constitutional burden at 
a trial on the merits, the court found the interests at play balanced in the 
plaintiffs’ favor.104  Finally, the court determined that the public would be 
served by enjoining the Solomon Amendment because the public is always 
served by enjoining state action that violates First Amendment rights.105  
Accordingly, the court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the case, 
and instructed the lower court to issue a preliminary injunction against the 
Solomon Amendment. 
D.  Dissent 
Judge Aldisert wrote a dissenting opinion, finding three issues that 
would compel a judgment for the DOD in support of the Solomon 
Amendment.106  The dissent argued that the court should presume the 
constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment.107  Precedence dictates, the 
dissent argued, that the court is under the duty to adopt the interpretation of 
a law that saves it from a constitutional attack.108  Second, the dissent 
 102. See id. (finding that the plaintiffs met the first element of the standard for 
preliminary injunction, which is a likely success on the merits of their claim). 
 103. See id. (holding that “[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal 
periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”) (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 
U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). 
 104. See id.  
 105. See id. (concluding that the fourth and final element of the standard for preliminary 
judgment, whether the granting of an injunction would benefit the public interest, has been 
met in the present case). 
 106. See id. at 246-47 (Aldisert, J, dissenting) (arguing that the plaintiffs must overcome 
a presumption of constitutionality, the court must make a permissible factual inference, and 
only if any inference can be made can the court analyze the First Amendment claims). 
 107. See id. at 248 (stating that “[t]he starting point for analysis must be fealty to the 
precept that congressional statutes are presumed to be constitutional.”). 
 108. See id. (Aldisert, J., dissenting); Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) 
(Holmes, J., concurring) (citing the principle that “[a]s between two possible interpretations 
of a statute . . . our plain duty is to adopt that which would save the Act” from a 
constitutional attack).  But see FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 229 n.8 (responding to the dissent by 
pointing out that the canons of statutory construction do not apply in this case, because it is 
not argued that there are two interpretations of the Solomon Amendment). 
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criticized the majority for neglecting to identify and discuss the 
congressional authority behind the Solomon Amendment.109  The scope of 
congressional authority, the dissent argued, compels the court to conduct a 
balancing test of First Amendment and congressional interests before the 
court engages in constitutional doctrinal analyses.110  Finally, the dissent 
took issue with the majority’s assumption that the mere presence of the 
military on a school’s campus suggested a breach of the law school’s anti-
discrimination policies.111  The dissent emphasized the qualities associated 
with military service: pride and honor.112  Additionally, the dissent 
suggested that the public understands that any message adopted by the 
military does not necessarily reflect law schools’ values merely because 
law schools allow the military on campus.113
IV.  PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
After the Third Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of a 
preliminary injunction, the DOD petitioned the Supreme Court to review 
the case.114  The DOD argued that the Third Circuit erred in its holding 
because the Solomon Amendment does not directly burden speech and the 
court applied the incorrect level of scrutiny to the law.115  Additionally, the 
DOD asserted a pressing need for immediate review.116  Not only would 
any injunction involve the “grave act” of invalidating an Act of Congress, 
the DOD argued, but in the present case, an injunction against the Solomon 
Amendment would detrimentally affect military recruiting, which could 
 109. See FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 249 (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (listing the various powers in 
the Constitution granting Congress the authority to enact the Solomon Amendment).  The 
dissent found no reported case where any act of Congress intended to support the military 
has been declared unconstitutional.  Id. at 249-50. 
 110. See id. at 250 (explaining that for the court to even reach First Amendment analysis, 
the plaintiffs “must first demonstrate that the mere presence of recruiting officers on campus 
constitutes a compellable inference that the law schools will be objectively and reasonably 
viewed as violating their anti-discrimination policies.”). 
 111. See id. at 251 (“I am unwilling to accept that there is a permissible inference, let 
alone a compellable one, that a military presence on campus to recruit, in and of itself, 
conjures up an immediate impression of a discriminatory institution.”). 
 112. See id. (stressing that the universal perception of those who serve in the armed 
forces is a positive one, that service men and women are considered heroes, and not one of a 
discriminatory institution). 
 113. See id. at 252 (explaining that “[f]rom these basic precepts of logic we cannot 
conclude that the mere presence of a uniformed military recruiter permits . . . the inference 
that a law school’s anti-discrimination policy is violated.”). 
 114. See id., petition for cert. filed, 73 U.S.L.W. 3531 (U.S. Feb. 28, 2005) (No. 04-
1152). 
 115. See id. at 12 (arguing that the Third Circuit’s analysis of the plaintiffs’ 
constitutional rights under the expressive association and compelled speech doctrines was 
flawed because the Solomon Amendment only has an incidental effect on their First 
Amendment rights).  Id. at 11-13. 
 116. See id. at 13. 
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ultimately compromise national security.117
On May 2, 2005, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and will hear the 
case in its next session.118  In the meantime, the DOD has motioned the 
Third Circuit to temporarily stay its mandate to the district court until the 
Supreme Court decides the case.119  Accordingly, for the time being, the 
Third Circuit will not instruct the district court to issue an injunction 
against the Solomon Amendment.120
V.  IMPLICATIONS 
If the district court ultimately issues an injunction, there is a good chance 
that the injunction will be national in scope.  This is because the plaintiffs 
in FAIR were an association of law schools and law professors from all 
over the country.121  Nationwide injunction of the Solomon Amendment 
would effectively invalidate the law; if this occurs, every law school with a 
policy against inviting employers who discriminate on the basis of 
homosexuality will be able to ban the military from on-campus recruiting 
without risking the loss of federal funds.122
But the implications of FAIR extend beyond law schools’ ability to ban 
military recruiters from their campuses.  For the first time in a federal 
appellate court decision, law schools have been recognized as expressive 
associations.123  That means schools have the right to exclude a person or 
entity if the inclusion of that person or entity substantially impairs schools’ 
ability to communicate their chosen message.124  Additionally, as the 
 117. See id. at 24-26 (arguing that the enjoining of a law on a constitutional basis itself is 
enough to merit Supreme Court review).  Additionally, the DOD asserted that FAIR 
demanded immediate review, because permitting law schools to ban military recruiting 
could hurt the functioning of the military, which could be a national security concern.  Id. 
 118. See FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S.Ct. 1977 
(May 2, 2005) (No. 04-1152). 
 119. See Appellees’ Motion to Stay the Mandate, FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (No. 03-4433) (requesting that the Third Circuit temporarily delay issuing its 
mandate to the lower court to issue a preliminary injunction until the Supreme Court 
reviews FAIR II); see also FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, No. 03-4433 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(order granting a stay on the mandate). 
 120. See id. (granting a stay on the issuance of a mandate “until further notice of the 
court”). 
 121. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d) (mandating that injunctions cover each party to the 
action); Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 4, at 3 (explaining that because FAIR is an 
association of law schools and law faculty from across the nation, an injunction would likely 
have to be national in scope to provide an effective remedy for every plaintiff); see also 
Burt, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 156 (following FAIR and finding the Solomon Amendment 
unconstitutional as applied to the faculty of Yale law school).  Burt illustrates the use of the 
FAIR logic outside the Third Circuit.  Id. 
 122. See FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 246. 
 123. See id. at 231. 
 124. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 647-60 (finding a constitutional right to exclude a person 
from membership in expressive association, if the inclusion of that entity would 
substantially impair the communication of the expressive association’s viewpoint). 
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dissent noted, FAIR represents the first instance in which a law created 
under Congress’s spending power for the benefit of the military was 
invalidated.125  If the Third Circuit’s decision stands, these types of laws 
may receive greater judicial scrutiny in the future.126  Finally, if law 
schools are permitted to ban the military from on-campus recruiting, and 
the military believes the ban impacts its ability to attract military lawyers, 
Congress may choose to rethink Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.127
A.  DOD Strategy for Trial 
Vital to the Third Circuit’s holding in FAIR was the fact that the DOD 
offered no proof that access to military recruiting in law schools was 
necessary to attract military lawyers.128  Because of this fact, the Solomon 
Amendment failed examination under both the strict scrutiny and 
intermediate scrutiny standards.129  The court seemed to suggest that its 
finding might have been different had the DOD identified any evidence that 
the military’s success in attracting military lawyers was necessarily tied to 
its access to law school campuses.130  At the trial for permanent injunction, 
the DOD might be able to defend the constitutionality of the Solomon 
Amendment by presenting the missing evidence, which the Third Circuit 
found lacking at the preliminary injunction stage.131  To win on the merits 
at trial, the DOD must prove that the Solomon Amendment is carefully 
tailored to attract military lawyers.132
 125. See FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 247 (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (observing that FAIR marked 
the first time a statute that was intended to support the military was ever declared 
unconstitutional under any First Amendment grounds). 
 126. See id. at 250 (declaring that the FAIR majority departed from the long-lived 
practice of presuming that laws benefiting the military are constitutional). 
 127. See Lore, supra note 9, at 5 (suggesting that the FAIR lawsuit focused on anti-
discrimination, and not antimilitary principles, and indicating that if the Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell policy were altered, law schools would not restrict the military’s on-campus 
recruitment efforts); Christopher Wolf, Stop Hunting Gay Troops: The Military’s ‘Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell’ Policy Is Baseless, Un-American Discrimination, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 10, 
2005, at 54 (encouraging the DOD to petition Congress for a rethinking of Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell instead of appealing the FAIR decision).  But see Scott D. Gerber, Allow Military 
Recruitment, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 15, 2003, at 34 (asserting that FAIR sued to challenge Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell).  If professors do not like the Solomon Amendment, they should take their 
grievances to Congress.  Id. 
 128. See FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 246 (concluding that “mere incantation of the need for 
legal talent cannot override a clear First Amendment impairment.”) (emphasis in original). 
 129. See id. at 234-35 (finding that the Solomon Amendment would fail intermediate 
scrutiny as well, because there was no proof in the record that there is any nexus between 
the state’s means, the Solomon Amendment, and the state’s ends, attracting military 
lawyers).   
 130. See id. at 245-46. 
 131. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 546 (1987) (stating that 
a court may grant permanent injunctive relief if the plaintiff shows a likelihood of success 
on merits). 
 132. See FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 234-35 (suggesting that the DOD might convince the 
district court that the Solomon Amendment survives strict scrutiny analysis by proffering 
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B.  FAIR’s Reliance on Dale 
The Third Circuit’s decision in FAIR also has an element of irony for 
proponents of gay and lesbian rights.133  In FAIR, the law schools relied 
heavily on the Dale decision in arguing that the Solomon Amendment 
unconstitutionally conditioned the law schools’ expressive association 
rights.134  In Dale, the Court used the expressive association doctrine to 
deny homosexual membership in the BSA.135  That decision was seen as a 
blow to the gay community.136  Yet FAIR adopted the same logic—that a 
private organization has a First Amendment right to exclude those who 
substantially impair the organization’s ability to communicate the 
organization’s chosen message—and applied it to vindicate gay and lesbian 
rights.137  When the Supreme Court reviews the FAIR decision, it will 
confront an interesting choice, either affirming the law schools’ rights to 
support their homosexual students by banning the military from recruiting 
on their campuses, or distinguishing and thus weakening the Dale decision, 
in which a private organization successfully used First Amendment 
principles to discriminate against homosexuals.138
CONCLUSION 
Since the enactment of the Solomon Amendment in 1994, law schools 
have had to choose between receiving vital federal funding and supporting 
their gay and lesbian students by banning the military from on-campus 
recruiting.139  On November 30, 2004, the Third Circuit found that the 
evidence at trial of the Solomon Amendment’s necessity in attracting military lawyers). 
 133. See id. at 230-34 (following the logic of Dale in holding that the Solomon 
Amendment cannot condition federal funds on law schools’ relinquishment of their right to 
support their homosexual students).  Interestingly, the Dale holding is widely perceived as 
anti-gay rights.  See Dale, 530 U.S. at 661; David L. Hudson, Jr., Boy Scouts Case Helps 
Gay Rights Cause, ABA JOURNAL E-REPORT, Dec. 3, 2004 (arguing that use of Dale to 
promote anti-discrimination is an unexpected outcome) (on file with the Journal of Gender, 
Social Policy & the Law).  
 134. See FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 230-32 (comparing the law schools’ situation in FAIR with 
the BSA’s situation in Dale).  The FAIR court followed the Dale Court’s logic in reasoning 
that the law schools, as expressive associations, had the First Amendment right to exclude 
persons who significantly compromised the communication of the schools’ viewpoint.  Id. at 
234. 
 135. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 661 (holding that the BSA as an expressive association had 
the First Amendment right to exclude homosexuals, because including homosexuals would 
significantly infringe on BSA’s ability to communicate their viewpoint). 
 136. See Hudson, supra note 133 (considering Dale to be a discriminatory case before 
FAIR made it into a principle of First Amendment freedom). 
 137. See id. (noting that Dale’s “expansive view of expressive association turned out to 
be exactly what was needed to give law schools . . . a basis” to challenge the Solomon 
Amendment). 
 138. See FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 230-32 (applying Dale’s expansive expressive association 
language to render the enforcement of the Solomon Amendment against law schools to be 
unconstitutional). 
 139. Compare AALS, EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE REGULATIONS § 6-3.2(a) (2004) (directing 
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enforcement of the Solomon Amendment against law schools was 
unconstitutional.140  The court found the statute unconstitutionally 
conditioned federal funds on the relinquishment of the law schools’ First 
Amendment rights under the doctrines of expressive association and 
compelled speech.141  Central to the court’s holding was the recognition 
that the act of recruiting was a form of expression.142  Regardless of how 
the Supreme Court rules on the case, the Third Circuit’s recognition of the 
law schools’ expressive association rights will likely impact the debate 
between military and law school interests. 
MICHAEL J. COLLINS 
 
member law schools to require employers to certify to the school’s nondiscrimination policy 
as a condition of obtaining Career Services assistance), available at http://www.aals.org/ecr/ 
2004ECRs.pdf (last visited June 10, 2005), with 10 U.S.C.S. § 983(b) (requiring law schools 
to provide military access to their on-campus recruiting in a manner that is “at least equal in 
quality and scope” as that which they provide to any other employer, or risk losing federal 
funding). 
 140. See FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 246. 
 141. See id. at 234-35, 243.   
 142. Compare id. at 234 (applying strict scrutiny to the Solomon Amendment because 
recruiting is a form of expression), with FAIR I, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 311-312 (applying 
intermediate scrutiny to the Solomon Amendment because recruiting is mixed speech and 
non-speech). 
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